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Abstract
This paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strat-
egy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic
when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under
strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) have the desired
convergence properties using an iterated dominance argument. For general games,
however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that have a continuous sup-
port. We present a sufficient condition for convergence based on elimination of
iteratively dominated strategies. This condition is more restrictive than CSS in
general but equivalent in the case of strategic complementarities. Finally, we offer
several economic applications of our results.
JEL Classification: C73
1 Introduction
In finite games, the static concept of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) captures
asymptotic stability under many dynamics.1 The literature of evolution in games with a
continuum of strategies has been less successful in this regard. Eshel and Motro (1981)
introduced an analogous concept to ESS: the Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS). This
paper provides some sufficient conditions under which a CSS is asymptotically stable
under the replicator dynamic.
It is well known that CSS is not sufficient for asymptotic stability in general. In fact,
it has been shown that a stronger concept than CSS, the Neighborhood Invader Strategy
(NIS), is necessary for convergence from arbitrary initial populations.2
∗I am grateful to Frank Riedel and Bill Sandholm for valuable comments.
†Institute of Mathematical Economics - Bielefeld University. Email: flouge@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de.
1The first result in this direction was provided by Taylor and Jonker (1978). See Sandholm (2010)
for a recent survey.
2See Eshel and Sansone (2003) and Cressman (2005). Apaloo (1997) provides an early treatment of
NIS.
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In this paper we show that positive convergence results can be obtained when the
support of the population is a continuum. In particular, if the game exhibits strategic
complementarities, the CSS requirement is sufficient for the evolutionarily stability of the
equilibrium. For general games, however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that
have a continuous support.
We introduce a closely related solution concept, the Dominance Solvable Strategy
(DSS), that guarantees convergence under two conditions on the initial population: (i) the
support is in a neighborhood of the DSS (2) the support is an interval. In general, DSS is a
stronger condition than CSS, but they coincide in the case of strategic complementarities.
Moreover, in the latter case, if a CSS/DSS is the unique equilibrium, then the convergence
occurs from even from distributions that are far way from the equilibrium, provided they
satisfy the continuous support.
A recurring property in evolutionary game theory is the one of superiority. Namely,
a strategy has to perform against an invader better than the invader against itself. A
CSS guarantees that locally superior strategies to an invader are in the direction of the
equilibrium. However, the convergence fails since these strategies might not be in the
support of the population. The related concept of NIS requires that the equilibrium itself
is locally superior against all potential invaders.
This paper focuses on the following question: if the population contains all interme-
diate strategies between the invader and the equilibrium, is a CSS asymptotically stable?
The question is particularly relevant since they are economic applications where the equi-
librium satisfies the CSS condition but are not NIS, such as first price auctions, as pointed
out in Louge and Riedel (2010).
Unfortunately, the answer to our question is negative in general games, although true
in games with strategic complementarities. We present an example in which the unique
equilibrium is a CSS (and a NIS) and it is unstable even for a population such that the
support is a continuum.3 The main problem is that, even though all locally superior
strategies to an invader are in the direction of the equilibrium, the best response to the
invader is not ‘close’ to the equilibrium. Our DSS concept, on the other hand, requires
explicitly all best responses to the invading strategy to be closer to the equilibrium than
the invader itself. Theorem 3 shows that this condition is sufficient for convergence.
We continue to provide some applications of our result to known economic models.
First, we consider the evolutionary model of a first price auction of Louge and Riedel
(2010). Since the unique Nash equilibrium is a CSS but not a NIS, our main theorem
provides a convincing argument in favor of the stability of the Nash equilibrium. Second,
show that the equilibrium in a contest model a` la Tullock (1980) is stable under the
replicator dynamic. Third, we present a Cournot duopoly. Since this model has been
studied extensively in the literature, we will use it to show consistency between this
3Our example elaborates on one provided in Eshel and Sansone (2003).
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paper and other positive results obtained in the literature. Finally, we consider Bertrand
competition with differentiated products. If demand and cost functions are linear, the
unique Nash equilibrium is always a CSS. Convergence is also obtained, despite the Nash
equilibrium not always being a NIS.
We focus on the replicator dynamic since it is perhaps the most well-known dynamic
in evolutionary game theory. Different models based on imitative behavior lead to this
dynamic (see Schlag, 1998 and Sandholm, 2010). Our main argument is based on elimi-
nation of iterated dominated strategies. Similar results were obtained by Samuelson and
Zhang (1992) for finite games, Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) for quadratic payoff func-
tions and Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007) in a model of evolution of preferences.
Our solution concept tries to capture the conditions that allow iterated domination as
established by Moulin (1984). The results from Moulin allow us also to conclude that
convergence in the replicator dynamic implies convergence in the Cournot dynamic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In section 3
we define our notion of iterated elimination of dominated strategies for a continuum
and show that they become extinct under the replicator dynamic. Section 4 introduces
the concept of DSS and shows its relation with CSS. Section 5 contains our main result,
namely, the convergence to DSS for general games and a more powerful result for strategic
complementarities. Section 6 presents applications of our results. Section 7 gives further
comparisons between our results and the ones known in the literature. Some concluding
remarks are offered in section 8. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a two-player game G = (S, pi) played by a single population. The strategy
space is S = [α, β] ⊂ R and pi : S × S → R is the (symmetric) payoff function, where
pi(x, y) is the payoff to strategy x against an opponent that plays strategy y. Let BR(y) =
argmaxx∈S pi(x, y) be the best response to strategy y. For most of our results, we will
need the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The payoff function pi is continuous.
Assumption 2. The payoff function pi is strictly quasiconcave in the first argument. That
is, for all x1 6= x2, y ∈ S and λ ∈ (0, 1), pi (λx1 + (1− λ)x2, y) > min {pi(x1, y), pi(x2, y)}.
Many economic applications satisfy these assumptions naturally (see Section 6). Ad-
ditionally, they make the model very tractable. First, since the strategy set is compact,
Assumption 1 guarantees that BR(y) is well defined and continuous at all y. Second,
Assumption 2 implies that BR is a function and that pi(x, y) is single peaked: pi(x, y) is
strictly increasing in the first argument if x < BR(y) and strictly decreasing if x > BR(y).
Finally, they imply that there is at least one symmetric (pure) Nash equilibrium.
3
We will say that a game G exhibits strategic complementarities if BR(y) is strictly
increasing.
A population is a probability measure P on S. The set of populations is denoted by
∆(S). Let P and Q be two populations. The expected payoff of P against Q is given by
Π(P,Q) =
∫∫
S
pi(x, y)P (dx)Q(dy) (1)
The continuity of pi and the compactness of S guarantee that (1) is well defined.
Define the excess payoff σ as follows
σ (x, P ) = Π (δx, P )− Π (P, P ) (2)
where δx is the Dirac measure that puts probability of 1 at x.
Consider a given initial population be P0. Let Pt be the population at time t > 0.
Denote the Borel σ-algebra on S by S . We will say that Pt evolves according to the
replicator dynamic if for all sets A ∈ S , we have
dP
dt
(A) =
∫
A
σ (x, Pt)Pt(dx) (3)
Under Assumption 1, pi is also bounded on S. Therefore, (3) is well defined and has
a unique solution.4
An important property of the replicator dynamic is that the support of the population
is time invariant. Formally, let C(P ) denote the support of a population P . If {Pt} evolves
according to (3), then C(Pt) = C(P0) for all t > 0.
3 Iteratively Dominated Strategies
It is well-known that iteratively (strictly) dominated strategies become extinct under the
replicator dynamic in finite games (see Samuelson and Zhang (1992)). Unfortunately,
there is currently no equivalent result for continuous strategy games. Here we will present
a particular notion of iterated dominance that will allow us extend the result of Samuelson
and Zhang and to prove our main result.
Definition 1. A set of strategies D is iteratively ε-dominated if there is a sequence of sets
{An, Bn}Nn=0 ⊆ S2(N+1) with An, Bn ∈ S and P0(An), P0(Bn) > 0 such that D ⊆
⋃
Bn
and for all n, all x ∈ An, y ∈ Bn and z ∈ R \
⋃
m<nBm
pi(x, z)− pi(y, z) ≥ ε (4)
4See Oechssler and Riedel (2001).
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Our definition of ε−dominance and the traditional definition of iterated dominance
differ in two aspects. First, we will typically need the payoff difference to be bounded
away from zero. Second, we need that the dominance occurs not between individual
strategies but by sets of strategies of positive measure. Finally, notice that this definition
considers only a finite number of iterations. While a more general definition could be
considered, this one suffices to prove our results.
Our first result uses a similar argument than the one in Cressman and Hofbauer (2005)
for the extinction of (iteratively) dominated strategies under the replicator dynamic for
some quadratic payoff functions. Lemma 1 shows that if D is iteratively ε-dominated,
then Pt(D) → 0 as t → ∞ at an exponential rate. Notice that for this result we
don’t need Assumptions 1 and 2, since it is assumed that the sequence {An, Bn}Nn=0
exists. However, pi is required to be bounded in order to have the replicator equation well
defined. Throughout the paper the replicator dynamic is convenient since the support of
the population is time invariant.
Lemma 1. Suppose that pi is bounded and that the population evolves according to the
replicator dynamic. If D is iteratively ε-dominated for some ε > 0 then, for all a ∈ (0, 1),
there exist k, T <∞ such that for all t > T :
Pt(D) ≤ ke−aεt (5)
In fact, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that the weight of
⋃m
n=0Bn goes to zero at an
exponential rate for all m ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
4 Static solution concepts
The concept of a CSS was introduced by Eshel and Motro (1981). A strategy x∗ is a
CSS if a monomorphic population using a strategy x in a neighborhood of x∗ can be
outperformed by some other (nearby) strategy x′ if and only if the distance from x′ to x∗
is smaller than the distance from x to x∗. It tries to capture the idea that if a population
uses strategies only in the neighborhood of a CSS, mutations could only drive it closer to
the CSS. Formally, x∗ ∈ S is a Continuously Stable Strategy if the following two conditions
are verified:
1. δx∗ is an ESS.
2. There exists an ε > 0 such that for all x with |x− x∗| < ε there exists η > 0 so
that for all x′ with |x− x′| < η
pi(x′, x) > pi(x, x) if and only if |x− x∗| > |x′ − x∗| (6)
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See Section 7 for the definition of an ESS.
Unfortunately, it is known that this concept does not guarantee convergence. This
is because CSS determines that there is a locally superior strategy to an invader in the
direction of the equilibrium. However, the convergence fails since this strategy might not
be in the support of the population. The related concept of NIS (see Section 7) requires
that the equilibrium itself is locally superior to potential invaders. As we will show in
Section 7, the NIS condition is not sufficient for convergence either.
It turns out that there is a related concept, which we will refer to as a Dominant
Solvable Strategy (DSS), that gives the desired convergence result. This concept captures
the conditions that guarantee dominance solvability in the traditional sense (see Moulin,
1984).
Definition 2. Strategy x∗ ∈ S is a Dominance Solvable Strategy (DSS) if the following
two conditions are verified:
1. δx∗ is an ESS.
2. There exists an η > 0 such that if |x− x∗| < η, then
|x− x∗| > |BR(x)− x∗| (7)
There is a close relation between these two concepts. In general, DSS imposes stronger
conditions. On the other hand, if the game exhibits strategic complementarities, then
both concepts are equivalent.
Lemma 2. Let x∗ be a DSS. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, then x∗ is a CSS. Moreover,
if G exhibits strategic complementarities, then the converse is also true.
5 Convergence
Before we can prove our main result, we have to specify a notion of convergence. As
Oechssler and Riedel (2002) advocate, the appropriate notion of distance between distri-
butions for our model is the Prohorov metric. With this metric, distribution can be close
both if (i) most probability is assigned to strategies that are arbitrarily close (although
not necessarily exactly the same ones) and (ii) small enough probability is assigned to
other strategies.
Formally, denote D(ε, A) an ε-neighborhood of set A ∈ S . Namely,
D(ε, A) = {x : ∃y ∈ A, |y − x| < ε} (8)
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The Prohorov distance ρ is given by
ρ(P,Q) = inf {ε > 0, Q(A) ≤ P (D(ε, A)) + ε and P (A) ≤ Q(D(ε, A)) + ε for all A ∈ S }
(9)
For the purposes of this paper, it is of special interest the Prohorov distance to a
Dirac measure δx. In this case, ρ(P, δx) < ε if and only if P [S \ (x− ε, x+ ε)] < ε.
In other words, two measures are close if for every set the weight on that set under
one measure is close to the weight of a neighborhood of that set under the other measure.
In the case of convergence to a Dirac measure on a strategy x, this implies that the
measure puts most weight on a neighborhood of x. Convergence in the Prohorov metric
is equivalent to weak convergence.
We are now ready to state our main result:
Theorem 3. Let G be a game that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Consider a population
Pt that evolves according to the replicator dynamic. If x
∗ is a DSS and C(P0) is an
interval, then there exists η > 0 such that for every initial population with {x∗} ⊂ C(P0) ⊆
[x∗ − η, x∗ + η], Pt → δx∗ as t→∞ in the Prohorov metric.
Figure 1 illustrates the proof of Theorem 3, which relies on Lemma 1. Let R be
the strategies that have not been eliminated after some interations. The sequence of
elimination we construct is such that R is an interval. Let R > x∗ be the largest strategy
in R. Define z ≡ argmaxy∈RBR(y). The DSS property implies that the best response to
a strategy is closer to the equilibrium than the strategy itself. Without loss of generality,
assume that z < R.5 The quasiconcavity assumption gives that, for any y, pi(x, y) is
strictly decreasing in x for all x > BR(y). Therefore, pi(x, y) is strictly decreasing in
the first argument for all x > BR(z) and all y ∈ R. This implies that BR(z) strictly
dominates R. So far, this dominance is pointwise only. Lemma 1, however, requires that
a set of positive measure is dominated by another set of positive measure. The rest of the
proof consist of constructing sets A and B such that for some ε > 0, pi(x, y)−pi(x′, y) ≥ ε
for all x ∈ A, x′ ∈ B against all y. This can be done as shown in Figure 1.
The converse to Theorem 3 is not true. For example, Cressman and Hofbauer (2005)
show that if the payoff function is quadratic, an equilibrium that satisfies the NIS con-
dition (which is stronger than CSS) is sufficient for convergence even when there are no
dominated strategies at all.
On the other hand, Section 7 presents an example in which an equilibrium that is NIS
(and therefore CSS) that is unstable under the replicator dynamic. This equilibrium is
not a DSS, so Theorem 3 does not apply.
Theorem 3 shows that the DSS condition is sufficient for dominance solvability. Moulin
(1984) shows also that it is almost necessary for (pointwise) dominance, and therefore
5If this is not true, then argminy∈RBR(y) > R and the symmetric argument is valid.
7
xpi
pi(x, z)
BR(z)
A
pi(x, y)
BR(y) R
B
Figure 1: Graphical interpretation of Theorem 3. Payoff function for strategy x against
z ≡ argmaxy′∈RBR(y′) and y ∈ R. Since pi(x, y) is strictly decreasing on the interval
[BR(z), R] for all y, set A dominates B. By Lemma 1, Pt(B)→ 0 as t→∞.
for our setwise definition. In particular, if the payoff function is differentiable, then it is
necessary that condition (7) is satisfied with equality or strict inequality.
The result from Theorem 3 can be extended to initial populations with large supports
under strategic complementarities. Remember that in this case, by Lemma 2, CSS and
DSS are equivalent. Despite these conditions being local, these properties are extend
beyond a neighborhood of the equilibrium. In the extreme case where the equilibrium is
unique, the ‘DSS property’ applies to the entire strategy space: the best response strategy
is always closer to the equilibrium than the original strategy.
Proposition 4. Suppose that G satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 and that the population
evolves according to the replicator dynamic. Assume additionally that G exhibits strategic
complementarities and that there is a unique Nash equilibrium x∗ that is also a CSS. If
C(P0) is an interval and {x∗} ⊆ C(P0) then Pt → δ∗ as t→∞ in the Prohorov metric.
A final corollary of our result is the relationship between convergence in the replicator
dynamic and the Cournot dynamic. The (discrete time) Cournot dynamic consists of
players choosing the best response to the opponent’s strategy in the previous period.
Moulin (1984) showed that, for the class of games we consider, (pointwise) dominance
solvability is equivalent to convergence in the Cournot dynamic. Our results show that
convergence in the Cournot dynamic implies convergence in the replicator dynamic. The
converse is not true, however, since our results give sufficient but not not necessary
conditions.
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6 Applications
In this section we will discuss some applications of Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 to known
economic models. Since our assumptions are fairly general, most models with continous
payoffs fall in the class of games we study.
6.1 First price auction
Consider an evolutionary model of a first price sealed bid auction with independent values,
as in Louge and Riedel (2010). There are 2 bidders and valuations, v, are distributed
uniformly on [0, 1]. The class of bidding functions allowed are b(v) = v
x
2
, where x ∈ S
is the bidder’s strategy. We assume S = [α, β] with 0 < α < 1 and β > 1. The unique
Nash equilibrium of the auction is b∗(v) = E[v′ | v > v′] = v
2
(i.e. x∗ = 1). The expected
payoff of strategy x against strategy y can be expressed as:
pi(x, y) =
xy(1 + 2y)
2x2 + 2x2y + 6xy + 4xy2 + 4y2
(10)
which is continuous and concave in x. Additionally, x∗ is a CSS (but not a NIS) with
respect to the class of functions allowed. This game exhibits strategic complementarities.6
All the above facts are obtained from Louge and Riedel (2010).
All the conditions for Proposition 4 are verified and we can obtain the following result:
Corollary 5. Let G describe a first price sealed bid auction, with bidding strategies b(v) =
vx
2
. Let x∗ = 1 be the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. Then, for any initial
population such that C(P0) ⊇ {x∗} is an interval, the replicator dynamic converges to δ1.
6.2 Contests
We introduce here a contest game a` la Tullock (1980). Let x be the effort chosen by
a player. The payoff function is pi(x, y) = p(x, y) − c(x), where p is the probability
of winning the contest when the opponent chooses effort y and c the cost. The value of
winning is normalized to 1. Assume c(x) = x and p(x, y) = x
x+ky
with k > 0. The strategy
set is S = [α, β], with α > 0 (although small). The best response is BR(y) = (ky)
1
2 − ky,
which is strictly increasing if y < 1
4k
and strictly decreasing if y > 1
4k
. The unique Nash
equilibrium of this game is x∗ = k
(1+k)2
is also a CSS and a NIS.
Consider first the case where k < 1. Then x∗ < 1
4k
. If β ∈ (x∗, 1
4k
]
, then this game
is of strategic complementarities. On the other hand, if k > 1 we have that x∗ > 1
4k
and
d
dy
BR(x∗) < 0. In this case, we will assume β ≥ k
(1+k)2
in order to have x∗ ∈ S. The
equilibrium is a DSS if k < 3.
6This property is straightforward, since the best response function BR(y) =
[
2y2
1+y
] 1
2
is strictly in-
creasing.
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We can now apply both Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 to this game and conclude:
Corollary 6. Let G be a contest and x∗ = k
(1+k)2
the unique Nash equilibrium of this
game. Let C(P0) be an interval. If k < 1 then, for any initial population such that
C(P0) ⊇ {x∗}, the replicator dynamic converges to δx∗. If 1 < k < 3, then there exists
µ > 0 such that if {x∗} ⊂ C(P0) ⊆ [x∗ − η, x∗ + η], the replicator dynamic converges to
δx∗.
6.3 Cournot duopoly
Two firms compete in a market setting quantities. The profit function is pi(x, y) =
xd(x+ y)− c(x) for a firm that produces quantity x against a firm that produces y. It is
assumed that c and d are differentiable, with d′ < 0, d′′ ≤ 0, c′ > 0 and c′′ ≥ 0. It is well
known that. under these assumptions, quantities are strategic substitutes and that there
is a unique equilibrium x∗. Because of the strategic substitutes property, the equilibrium
is automatically a CSS and a NIS. Also, under our assumptions, dBR
dy
(x∗) > −1. This
inequality implies also that x∗ is a DSS. Theorem 3 implies the following result.
Corollary 7. Let G be a Cournot duopoly. There exists µ > 0 such that if C(P0) ⊆
[x∗ − µ, x∗ + µ] is an interval, the replicator dynamic converges to δx∗.
It is well known that the Cournot dynamic converges in this game as well. As noted
above, convergence in the replicator dynamic implies convergence in the Cournot dy-
namic.
It can also be remarked that in this model dBR
dy
(y) > −1 for all y. This suggests
that the ‘DSS property’ can be extended to the full strategy space and give a global
convergence result in the spirit of Proposition 4. Unfortunately, the DSS solution concept
in its current form is only local and does not capture this feature of the model.
6.4 Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products
Consider a duopoly with differentiated products. There is a linear demand D(x, y) =
a−bx+dy for a firm that sets price x and a competitor that sets price y, where a, b, d > 0
and constant marginal cost c > 0. The strategy space is S = [0, β], for large enough β.
The profit function is then pi(x, y) = (a − bx + dy)(x − c), which is continuous and
concave. The best response function is BR(y) = (2b)−1(a+bc+dy). Since all parameters
are positive, this is a game of strategic complementarities. An equilibrium x∗ exists if
and only if d < 2b. When it exists, this equilibrium is unique and also a DSS (and
consequently a CSS). It is not a NIS unless d < b. We can summarize our conclusions:
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Corollary 8. Let G describe a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products with linear
demand and cost functions. Let x∗ be the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. Then,
for any initial population such that C(P0) ⊇ {x∗} is an interval, the replicator dynamic
converges to δx∗.
This result can be trivially extended to general payoff functions. However, when there
are multiple equilibria, not all of them are CSS. In particular, only the ones such that
the best response crosses the 45 degree line from above are CSS. Proposition 4 implies
that the replicator dynamic converges to the equilibria that satisfy the CSS requirement,
provided that initial distribution has support in an interval where no other equilibrium
exists.
7 Related literature
In this section we will compare our results above to others in the literature. First, we
introduce the solution concepts that were mentioned. Second, we present several examples
to clarify to which classes of games our results and the literature’s apply.
7.1 Other solution concepts
In addition to the concept of a CSS introduced in Section 4, there are two other relevant
static solution concepts for evolution in games with continuous strategies. First, the
classic concept of ESS of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) is usually formulated in the
following way. A population P ∈ ∆(S) is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) if for
every population Q 6= P there exists ε > 0 such that
Π(P, (1− ε)P + εQ) > Π(Q, (1− ε)P + εQ) (11)
This concept tries to capture the idea of an incumbent population P invaded by a
small fraction ε of mutants. The incumbents form an ESS if they outperform the mutants
in the new (mixed) population. Notice that every strict Nash Equilibrium is also a ESS.
The main problem in this definition is that there are some types of mutations that are
not taken into account. This concept is reasonable in finite games, since the only way
to be “close” to a population is to put arbitrarily high probability on it. In games of
continuous strategies this is no longer the case. In particular, an invading population can
be close to the incumbent because the supports are close, even though the distributions
might be dramatically different. Due to the linearity of Π, all strict equilibria are ESS.
If not strict, an ESS needs to be superior to all potential invaders.
Second, there is the concept of Neighborhood Invader Strategy (NIS). It was intro-
duced by Apaloo (1997) and it implies CSS. Formally, a strategy x∗ is a NIS if there
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exists an ε > 0 such that for all x with |x− x∗| < ε
pi(x∗, x) > pi(x, x) (12)
In words, NIS requires all populations using strategies in the neighborhood of x∗ to be
outperformed by x∗ itself, and not simply by a strategy closer to x∗. It has been shown
to be a necessary condition for general convergence under the replicator dynamic.7
In the case of strategic complementarities, a NIS is also a DSS. In general games, no
relation can be establish. The example below has an equilibrium that is a NIS but not
a DSS. Our application to Bertrand competition with differentiated products above have
equilibria that are DSS but not NIS.
7.2 An Example With Nondominance and Nonconvergence
This game was introduced in Eshel and Sansone (2003). Consider pi(x, y) = (x − y)4 −
2x4 − 2y4. We have that x∗ = 0 is strict Nash equilibrium (and therefore an ESS). It is
also a CSS and NIS, since for all y
pi(0, y) = −2y4 > −4y4 = pi(y, y) (13)
However, as we will see below, this equilibrium not stable under the replicator dynamic.
This function is strictly quasiconcave in x, although it is not concave (see Figure 2
below). The best response function is BR(y) = − [ 3√2− 1]−1 y. Therefore, strategies are
substitutes. Suppose that the initial population is a uniform distribution Qε on [−ε, ε].
It can be seen that
Π(δ0, Qε) = −1
5
ε4 <
4
15
ε4 = Π(Qε, Qε) (14)
In other words, a neighborhood around the equilibrium obtains an expected payoff
below the population average when the population is uniform. Moreover, using the
replicator dynamic and the initial population Qε, consider set A =
[− ε
2
, ε
2
]
. We obtain
dP
dt
(A)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= − 5
32
ε4 < 0 (15)
Therefore, δx∗ cannot be stable under the replicator dynamic.
Figure 2 illustrates why the argument of Theorem 3 is not valid in this example. The
strategy set is [−0.05, 0.05]. The functions depicted are the payoff of strategy x against
-0.05, 0 and 0.05. We have that BR(0.05) ≈ −0.1925 and BR(−0.05) ≈ 0.1925, violating
the DSS requirement. Since BR is continuous, [−0.05, 0, 0.05] ⊂ BR ([−0.05, 0, 0.05]).
Therefore, no strategy in [−0.05, 0.05] is dominated since all of them are best response
7See Eshel and Sansone (2003).
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xpi(x, y)
pi(x, 0)
pi(x, 0.05)
pi(x,−0.05)
0 0.05−0.05BR(0.05) BR(−0.05)
0
Figure 2: Example with payoff function pi(x, y) = (x − y)4 − 2x4 − 2y4 for y ∈
[−0.05, 0, 0.05]. The unique equilibrium x∗ = 0 is a CSS and a NIS, but unstable un-
der the replicator dynamic. However, [−0.05, 0, 0.05] ⊂ BR ([−0.05, 0, 0.05]). Therefore,
Theorem 3 does not apply since the equilibrium does not verify the DSS requirement.
to some strategy.
As inequality (15) shows, the set [−0.025, 0.025] obtains a lower expected payoff than
[−0.05,−0.025] ∪ [0.025, 0.05] when the population is uniform on [−0.05, 0.05]. This
is because, while pi(−0.025,−0.025) < pi(0,−0.025) < pi(0.025,−0.025), the difference
in the terms in the first inequality is much smaller than the difference for the second
inequality. On average, a neighborhood around x∗ = 0 does worse than the strategies on
the extremes of [−0.05, 0.05].
8 Summary
We have shown that when the initial population has full support around an equilibrium,
positive results regarding convergence of the replicator dynamic can be obtained. We
have introduced the concept of a Dominant Solvable Strategy (DSS) and showed that
under reasonable conditions on the payoff function (i.e. continuity and quasiconcavity),
a DSS is asymptotically stable. The result is even stronger in games with strategic com-
plementarities with a unique equilibrium. In this case, the replicator dynamic converges
to a DSS from any initial distribution with full support in an interval containing the
equilibrium.
A DSS is a more restrictive concept than a Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS). In the
case of strategic complementarities, however, they coincide. As shown above, there are
relevant economic applications with strategic complementarities where Nash equilibria are
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CSS but not NIS. Previous work had obtained a negative result in that NIS is a necessary
condition for convergence of the replicator dynamic from arbitrary populations. Here we
show that if the strategies used in the population are disperse enough (i.e. they are a
continuum), then the milder CSS (or DSS) condition can be sufficient for stability.
On the other hand, CSS and NIS where also not sufficient conditions for convergence,
as illustrated in the example of Section 7. For the examples known to us where CSS and
NIS do not converge, these equilibria are not DSS and Theorem 3 does not apply.
Our convergence result relies on the elimination of iteratively dominated strategies.
Despite this being a recurrent result in the literature, we had to modify it slightly in order
to extend it to continuous strategy games. Our iteratively ε-dominated concept needs to
include sets of strategies of positive measure and a difference in payoffs bounded away
from zero.
There is still an open question regarding the necessary conditions for convergence of
populations with continuous support. For example, positive results have been obtained
for NIS in quadratic payoff functions, even when these are not dominance solvable (see
Cressman and Hofbauer, 2005).
There is an interesting connection between the DSS concept and convergence of the
Cournot dynamic. Moulin (1984) showed that, for the class of games we consider, the
Cournot dynamic converges if and only if the game is dominance solvable. Together with
the results in this paper, we can conclude that convergence in the replicator dynamic
implies convergence in the Cournot dynamic.
Our DSS concept, as well as CSS and NIS are local conditions. Bomze (1990, 1991)
propose solution concepts that capture small invasions of mutants using strategies far
from the equilibrium. There is still progress to be made in combining the features of
both the local concepts with his uninvadability requirement.
There are some economic applications that do not fit in our class. In particular, some
continuous strategy games have discontinuous payoff functions such as the Nash demand
and ultimatum games. There are still few results for this important group of models.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that D is dominated via some sequence {An, Bn}Nn=0 that
verifies (4). Fix some a ∈ (0, 1). We will show that for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} there exist
kn, Tn such that for all t > Tn
n∑
m=0
Pt(Bm) ≤ kne−aε(t−Tn) (16)
Consequently,
Pt(D) ≤ Pt(
N⋃
n=0
Bn) ≤
N∑
n=0
Pt(Bn) ≤ kNe−aε(t−TN ) =
[
kNe
aεTN
]
e−aεt (17)
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for all t > TN .
The proof is by induction. Consider first A0 and B0. Since pi is bounded, (3) is well
defined and it gives:
d
dt
(
Pt(A0)
Pt(B0)
)
=
1
(Pt(B0))
2
[
Pt(B0)
∫
A0
σ (x, Pt)Pt(dx) + Pt(A0)
∫
B0
σ (x, Pt)Pt(dx)
]
(18)
=
1
(Pt(B0))
2
[
Pt(B0)
∫
S
∫
A0
pi (x, z)Pt(dx)Pt(dz)+ (19)
+ Pt(A0)
∫
R
∫
B0
pi (x, z)Pt(dx)P (tdz)
]
(20)
=
1
(Pt(B0))
2
∫
R
∫
A0
∫
B0
[pi(x, z)− pi(y, z)]Pt(dx)Pt(dy)Pt(dz) (21)
≥ ε
(Pt(B0))
2
∫
A0
∫
B0
Pt(dx)Pt(dy) (22)
=
Pt(A0)
Pt(B0)
ε > 0 (23)
Integrating we obtain
Pt(B0) ≤ Pt(A0)P0(B0)
P0(A0)
e−εt ≤ 1
P0(A0)
e−aεt (24)
Therefore, (16) is verified for k0 =
1
P0(A0)
and T0 = 0.
Now assume that there exist kn−1, Tn−1 such that
∑n−1
m=0 P (Bm) ≤ kn−1e−aε(t−Tn−1) for
t > Tn−1. We will show that there exists kn, Tn such that
∑n
m=0 P (Bm) ≤ kn+1e−aε(t−Tn)
t > Tn. Define p¯i = maxx,y∈S |pi(x, y)| <∞. The replicator equation gives:
d
dt
(
Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
)
=
1
(Pt(Bn))
2
∫
R
∫
An
∫
Bn
[pi(x, z)− pi(y, z)]Pt(dx)Pt(dy)Pt(dz) (25)
=
1
(Pt(Bn))
2
∫
R\∪n−1m=0Bm
∫
An
∫
Bn
[pi(x, z)− pi(y, z)]Pt(dx)Pt(dy)Pt(dz)+
(26)
+
1
(Pt(Bn))
2
∫
∪n−1m=0Bm
∫
Ai
∫
Bn
[pi(x, z)− pi(y, z)]Pt(dx)Pt(dy)Pt(dz)
(27)
≥ Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
[
ε
(
1− P
(
n−1⋃
m=0
Bm
))
− 2p¯iPt
(
n−1⋃
m=0
Bm
)]
(28)
≥ Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
[
ε− (2p¯i + ε)
n−1∑
m=0
Pt(Bm)
]
(29)
Define Tn such that
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(1− a)ε
2p¯i + ε
= kn−1e−aε(Tn−Tn−1) ≥
n−1∑
m=0
PTn(Bm) (30)
Then for all t > Tn
d
dt
(
Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
)
≥ Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
[
ε− (2p¯i + ε) (1− a)ε
2p¯i + ε
]
=
Pt(An)
Pt(Bn)
aε (31)
Integration gives for all t > Tn
Pt(Bn) ≤ Pt(An)PTn(Bn)
PTn(An)
e−aε(t−Tn) ≤ 1
PTn(An)
e−aεt−Tn+1 (32)
Finally,
n∑
m=0
P (Bm) ≤ kn−1e−aε(t−Tn−1) + 1
PTn(An)
e−aε(t−Tn) (33)
=
[
(1− a)ε
2p¯i + ε
+
1
PTn(An)
]
e−aε(t−Tn) (34)
≡ kne−aε(t−Tn) (35)
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that (7) is verified for ε > 0. Without loss of generality,
assume y ∈ (x∗, x∗ + ε]. Then BR(y) < y. By strict quasiconcavity, pi(x, y) is strictly
decreasing for all x > BR(y). Therefore, in a neighborhood around y, pi(x, y) > pi(y, y)
if and only if x < y. Since y > x∗, then this is equivalent to |y − x∗| > |x− x∗|.
Suppose now that BR is strictly increasing. Take y > x∗. Then, BR(y) > BR(x∗) =
x∗. Since x∗ is a CSS, then pi(x, y) is strictly decreasing in the first argument at y. Strict
quasiconcavity implies then that BR(y) < y. Putting both inequalities together, we get
|y − x∗| > |BR(y)− x∗|. The same argument applies to y < x∗.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let η > 0 be such that (7) is satisfied. We will show that for every
η′ ∈ (0, η) there exists ε > 0 such that C(P0) \ [x∗− η′, x∗+ η′] is iteratively ε-dominated
via a sequence {An, Bn}Nn=0.
Define R0 = C(P0) and Rn = R0 \ ∪n−1m=0Bm. Since R is an interval, we have R0 =
[R0, R0]. We will construct our sequence so that Rn is an interval for all n.
Consider first the case where
0 < x∗ −Rn < η′ < Rn − x∗ (36)
for some n. Since x∗ is a DSS, it follows that rn ≡ argmaxy∈Rn BR(y) ∈ [x∗, Rn).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, pi(x, y) is strictly decreasing in the first argument for all
x ≥ BR(y). This argument implies that
pi(rn, y) > pi(Rn, y) (37)
for all y ∈ Rn.
Since R0\[x∗−η′, x∗+η′] is compact and |y −BR(y)| is continuous and strictly positive
on this set, there exists γ > 0 such that |y −BR(y)| ≥ γ for all y ∈ R0 \ [x∗− η′, x∗+ η′].
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Define the sets
An = [rn, rn +
γ
3
] (38)
Bn = [Bn, Rn] (39)
where Bn = max{Rn − γ3 , x∗ + η
′
2
}. Set
εn = min
y∈Rn
[
pi(rn +
γ
3
, y)− pi(Rn − γ
3
, y)
]
> 0 (40)
Therefore, every strategy in An obtains a payoff at least εn higher that any strategy
in Bn. Notice that An and Bn have positive measure. Additionally, if (36) if verified for
some Rn, then it is verified for all Rm with m > n.
Fix N so that R0 − N γ3 ≤ x∗ + η′ < R0 − (N − 1)γ3 . Since γ is bounded away from
zero, N is finite.
Define ε = minn≤N εn > 0. Therefore, we have shown that [x∗ + η′, R0] ⊂ ∪Nn=0Bn is
ε-dominated. By Lemma 1, then there exists a finite t′ such that Pt
(
[x∗ + η′, R0]
)
< 1−η′
for all t′ > t.
The second case, where
0 < Rn − x∗ < η′ < x∗ −Rn (41)
for some n is exactly symmetric to the previous case. The same proof can be contructed
for rn ≡ argminy∈Rn BR(y) ∈ (Rn, x∗] and the sets
An = [rn −
γ
3
, rn] (42)
Bn = [Rn, Bn] (43)
where Bn = min{Rn + γ3 , x∗ − η
′
2
}.
Finally, suppose
η′ < min{x∗ −Rn∗, Rn − x∗} (44)
In this case, the previous argument can be modified in the following way. If |x∗ − rn| ≤
|x∗ − rn|, then An, Bn are given by (38)-(39). Otherwise, if |x∗ − rn| > |x∗ − rn|, then
An, Bn are given by (42)-(43).
This construction continues as long as n satisfies (44). After a finite number of periods,
either (36) or (41) will hold. Then, sets An, Bn are constructed according to (38)-(39) or
(42)-(43), respectively, for all subsequent iterations.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let C(P0) =
[
R0, R0
]
. In the case of strategic complementari-
ties, we can consider the intervals [R0, x
∗] and
[
x∗, R0
]
independently. Without loss of
generality, we will prove the result for C(P0) = R0 =
[
x∗, R0
]
.
Since x∗ is a Nash equilibrium, BR(x∗) = x∗. Under strategic complementarities,
BR(x) > x∗ for all x > x∗. By Lemma 2, x∗ is a DSS. That is, for some η > 0,
x ∈ (x∗, x∗+η) implies BR(x) < x. Since the equilibrium is unique and BR is continuous,
then x∗ < BR(x) < x for all x > x∗.
For a fixed η′ > 0, there exists γ > 0 such that |y −BR(y)| ≥ γ for all y ∈ [x∗+η′, R0].
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Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, define Rn =
[
x∗, Rn
]
= R0 \ ∪n−1m=0Bm and
rn = BR(Rn) < Rn to construct the sequence of sets {An, Bn} as in (38)-(39). Define
ε = minn≤N εn > 0, where εn is given by (40). Therefore, we have shown that [x∗ +
η′, R0] ⊂ ∪Nn=0Bn is ε-dominated. By Lemma 1, then there exists a finite t′ such that
Pt
(
[x∗ + η′, R0]
)
< 1− η′ for all t′ > t.
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